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Benchmarking  is  a  technique  of  performance  evaluation  in  which  comparisons  are  made  to 
benchmarks that represent external performance standards. In the field of regulation of public 
utilities, benchmarking can be used as an element of performance-based regulation or as a pure 
regulatory method, called yardstick competition. In the absence of competition, benchmarking 
can be used to simulate competitive pressures by comparing a regulated firm’s performance 
against an efficient standard.  
The aim of this paper is to examine the Central European regulatory benchmarking practices in 
the energy sector, namely the electricity and natural gas distribution industries, and to analyse 
the possibilities of further development of regulatory benchmarking in this region. The countries 
onto which we focus are Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland.  In  the  region  of  Central  Europe  there  are  still  significant  differences  between 
countries,  especially  in  terms  of  experiences  in  modern  regulation,  regulatory  methods  and 
practices, level of economic development etc. Differences are considerable especially between 
Western countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland) and the countries of former Eastern Bloc 
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland). As a result, the degree of the use of regulatory 
benchmarking is also very diverse within this region.  
In the first part of the paper, we develop basic theoretic concepts of economic regulation. Then 
we describe the most frequently used regulatory methods – cost-of-service regulation, incentive 
regulation  and  yardstick  competition  –  and  we  deal  with  common  regulatory  benchmarking 
techniques, describe their principles and main challenges. Subsequenty, we provide an overview 
of regulatory methods and benchmarking practices for each country in the region of interest. In 
the final part of the paper, we analyse the challenges and possibilities for further development of 
regulatory benchmarking in the Central Europe.  
We have found that except for Switzerland, all Central European regulatory regimes are based 
on some form of incentive regulation. The most sophisticated methods of benchmarking are used 
in Germany and Austria. In these countries, benchmarking is used in both electricity and natural 
gas industries. The Polish regulator is using a benchmarking method in cost efficiency analysis 
in electricity distribution. In Hungary, a specific method of benchmarking is used. In Switzerland, 
no  benchmarking  is  used  at  present.  In  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia,  some  principles  of 
benchmarking are adopted, but not directly to the revenue requirements setting. We summarize 
that the possibilities for development of regulatory benchmarking in the Central Europe could be 
extended by reducing market concentration, unbundling large vertically integrated companies, 
establishing a closer cooperation with the private sector and closer harmonization of regulatory 
frameworks. 
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1. Introduction 
Energy sector, which traditionally includes electricity, gas and heat industry, has some inherent 
characteristics which result in state regulation of energy utilities. Contemporary trends, such as 
privatisation, mergers, legal unbundling, separation of competitive and non-competitive segments 
produce new challenges for regulation in Europe. The main purpose of economic regulation is to 
achieve competitive results in an environment where competition is (for various reasons) not 
feasible.  
An efficient competition puts a company under pressures, sometimes reffered to as „carrot and 
stick“. The carrot means that if a firm produces at lower costs than its competitors, then its profits 
will be higher. The stick means that an unability to keep costs below its competitors will make 
the firm go out of business in long term. Regulatory commisions, willing to achieve maximum 
efficiency, therefore face the challenge to simulate competitive pressures, which should induce a 
company to behave as if it were exposed to real competition. However, traditional methods of 
regulation do not provide sufficient incentives for utilities to increase productivity in a quest for 
lower costs.  
Regulatory benchmarking is an element of incentive regulation that can be used to set efficiency 
requirements based on a relative efficiency assessment. This paper examines the actual practice 
in  central  Europe  (ie  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  Hungary,  Poland,  Germany,  Austria  and 
Switzerland) and possibilities of improvement in the field of regulatory benchmarking within this 
region. 
 
2. Basic concepts of economic regulation 
Regulation usually takes place when (Phillips, 1993) 
- competition is feasible but does not last long, so a competitive output is not achievable; 
- competition is feasible but a competitive output is not achievable due to market imperfections; 
- competition is feasible and a competitive output is achievable, but with regard to the social 
welfare this output is not sufficient. 
Usually, regulated companies have characteristics of natural monopolies, although not all of them 
(eg trucking in the United States). Market conditions are constantly changing – new technologies 
are being developed, market size is changing – so a demise of natural monopoly is almost never 
excluded.  
Public utilities often have the following properties (Bonbright, 1961): 
- inherent economies of scale and scope; 
- essential product with a low price and cross elasticity of demand; 
- capital-intensive production, the product represents an essential input for other industries of the 
entire economy; 
- non-storable and non-transferable product, synchronous production and consumption, excess 
capacity, fixed connection with customers; 
- variable and seasonal character of demand; 
- obligation to serve all customers who are able and willing to pay for the service (public service 
obligation). 
Following the concepts of natural monopoly or destructive competition (Kahn, 1988) or for social 
reasons, governement may decide to regulate price level, quality-of-service, market entry and exit 
conditions and impose public service obligations. 
This paper focuses on price (tariff) regulation. The main task of regulatory agencies is to set a 
price level that mimics the competitive price level. However, when competition is not feasible, 
this is a formidable task. The situation of natural monopoly tariff setting is illustrated below. 82 
 
Figure 1: The concept of natural monopoly 
Source: Lesser, A., Giacchino, L. Fundamentals of Energy Regulation. Vienna, Public Utility Reports, 
2009. 
 
In conditions of natural monopoly, the curve of average costs (AC) is decreasing due to the 
economies of scale. Monopoly power causes that the marginal revenues curve (MR) has a lower 
slope than the demand curve (D). The competitive output (Q) and price (P) is achieved at the 
intersect of demand (D) and marginal costs (MC). However, if the price was set at P, total 
revenues (P × Q) would not cover total costs (AC × Q) and the company would eventually go out 
of business. The task of regulators is to achieve competitive output and to allow the regulated 
company to cover its costs and achieve a reasonable rate of return on its capital. 
 
3. Basic methods of tariff regulation 
Traditional tariff setting is based on revenue requirements (RR) that should allow a company to 
cover its expenses and have a reasonable rate of return on its invested capital. Eligible expenses 
must be „prudent“, „known and measurable“ and „used and useful“ (Lesser, 2009). All other 
expenses are excluded from revenue requirements.  
Usually, revenue requirements for a regulatory period (typically 5 years) are calculated using the 
following formula (Lesser, 2009): 
 
RR = O&M + A&G + T + D + (WACC × RB),  (1)   
where RR denotes revenue requirements, O&M denotes operation and maintenance costs,  A&G 
denotes  administration  and  general  costs,  T  denotes  taxes,  D  denotes  depreciation  and 
amortization,  WACC  is  the  weighted  average  cost  of  capital  (after  taxes)  and  RB  denotes 
regulatory asset base (sum of assets book value and working capital). 
A classical cost-of-service regulation (COS regulation) is based on summing eligible expenses 
and calculating a required rate of return. This approach has several disadvantages – information 
asymmetries between regulator and regulated companies, incentive to overinvest (A-J-W effect) 
or to invest imprudently (gold plating) – and does not simulate competition pressures, especially 
the above-mentioned „stick“. 
The aim of incentive regulation (performance-based regulation, PBR regulation) is to reduce the 
impact of information asymmetries and to provide a stronger incentive for a company to reduce 
its costs. Usually, it is based on a price cap or a revenue cap. For each year, the regulatory agency 
limits the price level or revenues. The regulated company is motivated to reduce its costs in order 
to  increase  profits. The revenues  are  capped according  to  the inflation  rate  (RPI-factor)  and 83 
efficiency factor (X-factor), that’s why this method is also called RPI-X regulation. However, if 
the  cap  is  set  also  according  to  a  company’s  own  costs,  then  the  negative  effects  of  COS 
regulation (overinvestment, gold plating etc.) are not fully eliminated. 
In a competitive environment, a firm’s earnings are related to the industry average and to the 
firm’s relative market position. A firm has to reduce its costs below its competitors in order to 
survive. Setting the cap with respect to the performance of other companies is the main principle 
of the third regulatory method, yardstick competition, which is based entirely on regulatory 
benchmarking. 
 
4. Regulatory benchmarking 
The idea of regulatory benchmarking is that a firm’s revenue requirements should not be based 
on its own costs, but rather on a relative efficiency measurement (Schleifer, 1985). The objective 
of benchmarking is to establish a system that determines a firm’s efficient revenue requirements 
based on measuring a firm’s efficiency against a reference performance. If correctly applied, this 
approach  eliminates  the  negative  consequences  of  information  asymmetries.  Regulatory 
benchmarking can be used to determine both price and quality efficient levels.  
However, some issues arise when applying this approach. Firstly, regulatory agencies have to 
choose an adequate sample of firms, but firms and their environment tend to be heterogeneous. 
Difficulties also arise in gathering and comparing data. Thirdly, modelling can become more and 
more  costly  and  marginal  benefits  of  more  accurate  price  setting  can  be  overwhelmed  by 
marginal costs of doing so. Fourthly, regulated firms could agree to act in some collusive fashion 
and to manipulate with data together. Fifthly, a threat of going out of business has to be credible, 
but  governments  usually  tend  to  protect  utilities  from  bankruptcy  (Lesser,  2009).  Sixthly, 
adequate methods have to be chosen. 
A utility’s performance can be measured in three basic areas: quality, efficiency and productivity. 
Productivity is measured as a ratio of output and input. These indices can be based on partial 
indicators  (labour,  costs  etc)  or  total  factor  productivity  (TFP),  but  issues  resulting  from 
heterogeneity prevail. 
In regulatory practice, frontier methods for estimating efficiency are the most widely used. Cost 
frontiers define minimum cost level of producing a given output with a given input. Inefficiency 
is then represented as the distance of a company from this frontier. 
Deterministic  methods  (OLS,  COLS,  MOLS)  assume  that  all  data  can  be  observed.  OLS 
(ordinary least squares) is a classical technique of estimating cost frontiers: it is an estimate of an 
average cost function of a sample of firms based on the relationship between total costs and other 
variables (market conditions, area, grid length etc). Statistical analysis can be used to isolate the 
impact of specific conditions. This method can be used in the case of companies with relatively 
similar cost structure and requires large data sets to obtain reliable results.  COLS (corrected 
OLS) is a modification of OLS, with a shift of the frontier towards the best performing company. 
MOLS (modified OLS) is less restrictive than COLS with a slighter shift of the cost frontier. 
Stochastic methods (stochastic frontier analysis, SFA) take into account possible measurement 
errors and chance factors. An estimate of noise distribution has to be made for each observed 
firm. Typically, higher efficiency scores are achieved than when using deterministic methods. 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a method in operations research. It is based on comparison 
of multiple variables (costs per customer, costs  per km of grid etc), searching for points with the 
lowest unit costs and connecting these points to form an efficiency frontier. Companies not on the 
frontier  are  considered  inefficients.  As  with  above-mentioned  methods,  inefficiency  is 
represented by the distance of a company from the frontier. 
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5. Benchmarking in the Central Europe: an overview 
In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  regulatory  benchmarking  practices  in  following  countries:  Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Austria, Germany and Switzerland. 
 
Czech republic 
The Czech energy regulatory agency (Energetický regulační úřad, ERÚ) is using a revenue-cap 
incentive regulation. To determine revenue requirements, an ordinary RPI-X regulatory formula 
has been used, where certain parameters (WACC, D/E ratio, beta coefficient) and X-factor were 
determined using simple benchmarking methods. As the Czech energy market is relatively small, 
foreign experiences have been used. For example, the beta coefficient was set as an average of 
comparable european firm‘s beta from abroad. However, revenue requirements are being set 
based on a firm’s own costs, which causes that issues of traditional regulatory methods are not 
eliminated.  No  true  regulatory  benchmarking  was  used  (ERÚ,  2009).  The  number  of  firms 
operating on regulated markets is relatively low. 
 
Slovakia 
The Slovak energy market is regulated by the Agency for regulation of network industries (Úrad 
pre reguláciu sieťových odvetví, ÚRSO). Price regulation is based on a traditional price-cap 
incentive regulation. Prices are set individually according to regulatory formula which takes into 
account price inflation and X-factor (ÚRSO, 2008). The formula and its parameter setting are 
very  similar  to  the  Czech  ones.  No  true  regulatory  benchmarking  was  used.  The  regulated 
markets are very concentrated, for instance, only one pipeline (Slovenský plynárenský priemysel) 
is operating in natural gas regional distribution. The price caps in gas transportation and gas 
storage are based on comparing Slovak tariffs with EU tariffs (ÚRSO, 2009). The analysis has to 
take into account only similar european firms, with regard to geological, technical and other 
(working capacity, injection rate and production capacity) characteristics. 
 
Hungary 
Similarly to the Slovak ÚRSO agency, the Hungarian energy regulatory agency (Magyar Energia 
Hivatal, MEH) is using a price-cap RPI-X incentive regulation for the electricity sector. Unlike 
ERÚ and ÚRSO, MEH calculates regulatory formula parameters (beta, WACC etc) based on 
Hungarian local conditions, such as BUX stock exchange index and companies stocks (MEH, 
2009). D/E ratio is determined using domestic benchmarking. In the field of natural gas and 
electricity transportation and distribution, a relatively complicated but promising non-frontier 
benchmarking  system  has  been  used  to  determine  allowed  operational  costs.  Before 
benchmarking, costs were corrected in order to mitigate regional differences (wages, consumer 
structure) and geographical and technical differences. Average (benchmark) operational costs 
were then incorporated into revenue requirements. Both international and domestic data have 
been  used  (Haney,  2009).  A  simple  frontier  technique  has  been  used  in  setting  quality 
requirements, where desired quality performance has been calculated from average values over a 
short period. Failure to comply with these standards was penalized, although there was a 5% 
tolerance in order to mitigate chance factors (Tersztyanszky, 2005). 
 
Poland 
The Polish energy market is regulated by the agency Urząd Regulacji Energetyki (URE), but 
rules of tariff setting are determined by the Ministry of Economy (Ministerstwo Gospodarki). A 
price-cap RPI-X incentive regulation has been used. As the Polish energy market is relatively 
large, benchmarking methods are more easily appliable. However, there are only a relatively few 
companies are operating on the market, with regard to the total country area and population. 
Benchmarking has been used only in the field of electricity distribution. Electricity transmission 
and gas transportation and distribution are not regulated using benchmarking techniques.   85 
As benchmarking technique, a Bayesian random effect model (a SFA method) in cost efficiency 




The German energy market is significantly larger (in terms of system operators) than the above-
mentioned  markets.  It  is  regulated  by  Bundesnetz-agentur  (BNetzA).  A  revenue-cap  RPI-X 
regulation has been used since 2009. BNeztA uses a regulatory formula which contains a general 
and an individual X-factor. The individual X-factor is determined using benchmarking DEA and 
SFA methods fot both electricity and gas industries. The two methods are applied to two cost 
bases and a „best-of-four“ scheme is then applied: out of four results, the efficiency score that is 
the most favourable to a company is taken to calculate its individual X-factor. A total controllable 
expenditures (totex) benchmarking has been used, in contrast with UK, where operational costs 
(opex) and capital costs (capex) are treated separately.  




The Austrian regulatory agency Energie-Control (E-Control) is using benchmarking methods for 
both electricity and gas industries. As in Germany, the Austrian energy markets is much less 
concentrated than in other previously mentioned countries and there is a large number of system 
operators  in  the  market.  Domestic  and  international  data  have  been  used  for  regulatory 
benchmarking.  As  in  Germany,  total  expenditures  (totex)  are  taken  into  consideration.  The 
regulator has been using DEA and MOLS methods. DEA and MOLS give different results, which 
are then weighted using a „weak-of-method“: the better results gets weighted by 60%, the worse 




Having only a short history of regulation, the Swiss energy regulatory framework is carried out 
by multiple institutions – for example the ElCom regulatory agency, the association of companies 
operation in the electricity sector - Verband Schweizerischer Elektrizitätsunternehmen (VSE), 
Bundesamt für Energie (BFE) and more.  
As natural gas plays only a minor role in the Swiss energy industry, tariffs in the gas sector are 
not  specifically  regulated,  but  they  must  comply  to  the  national  antitrust  law.  Tariffs  for 
electricity  distribution  have  been  regulated  based  on  a  rate-of-return  (COS)  method.    The 
methodology has been co-prepared by the VSE association, so regulated firms have been directly 
involved into the regulatory process. Due to a large number of companies involved in distribution 
sector, possibilities for benchmarking are considerable, but still it is not used.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Regulatory methods differ across the region of Central Europe, but except for Switzerland all of 
them are based on some form of incentive regulation. Regulatory benchmarking can be used as 
an element of incentive regulation or as a pure regulatory method (yardstick competition).  
The  most  sophisticated  methods  of  benchmarking  are  used  in  Germany  and  Austria,  where 
energy markets are developed and a large number of firms are operating on the market. In these 
countries,  benchmarking  is  used  in  both  electricity  and  natural  gas  industries.  The  Polish 
regulator is using a SFA method in cost efficiency analysis in electricity distribution. However, 
the  Polish  energy  market  is  still  very  concentrated,  which  limits  the  possibilities  of  further 
development of domestic benchmarking. In Hungary, a non-frontier method of benchmarking is 
used. The Hungarian energy market is relatively small, causing the need for data from foreign 86 
companies. In Switzerland, no benchmarking is used at present. In Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
some  principles  of  benchmarking  are  adopted,  but  not  directly  to  the  revenue  requirements 
setting. These markets are small and relatively concentrated. 
The possibilities for development of regulatory benchmarking in the Central Europe could be 
extended by reducing market concentration in order to obtain a larger sample of firms. Domestic 
benchmarking  is  more  accurate  due  to  more  similar  environment  (including  political  and 
economic conditions, legislation, regulatory framework etc). However, long time series are not 
obtainable, due to only a short history of modern regulation in most countries (notably those from 
the former Eastern Bloc). In addition, large vertically integrated companies are still present in the 
markets,  which  complicates  the  separation  of  regulated  and  non-regulated  activities.  An 
unbundling of these companies would facilitate data collection and comparability. A cooperation 
with the private sector is needed in order to establish an acceptance of the benchmarking results, 
which  would  reduce  court  costs  due  to  companies  undertaking  legal  steps.  A  closer 
harmonization of regulatory frameworks would slightly reduce the disparity of companies and 
data gathered. Although regulatory agencies are members of pan-european organisations such as 
ACER or CEER, regulatory policies remain still in the hands of individual countries. 
 
This paper was written with financial support from the Internal Grant Agency of the University 
of Economics in Prague, project No. F2/22/2011 "Regulation of energy utilites in Central Europe 
and the possibilities for improvement." 
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